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1In the latter half of the 1980s, Japanese avowals of their growing
commitment to basic research and the increasing Japanese spending on research and
development have thrown into sharp relief one of the major transformations of the
final two decades of the twentieth century: the globalization of technology. As
Ray Vernon has pointed out, "The propensity of technology to cross national
boundaries has been growing rapidly, mainly as a result of the improvement in
communication and transport."' But the globalization of technology involves more
than the growing permeability of national technology systems, with technology
quickly moving from the most advanced to the less advanced nations. It
increasingly extends to the growing interdependence of the science and technology
systems of the highly industrialized countries. At the level of the firm, it
entails not only the need for carefully constructed strategies for transferring
technology to subsidiaries and affiliated firms abroad, but also increasing
pressures to participate in the technology systems of countries outside the home
country.
The globalization of technology is being driven by four kinds of factors:
those directly concerned with science and technology; market factors; government-
related and regulatory factors; and competitive factors. The latter two operate
primarily at the level of the firm; the first two affect the growing
interdependence of national systems directly as well as through the border-
spanning activities of firms. Those activities can take three forms:
international technology scanning and acquisition; strategic alliances with
foreign partners; and setting up R&D facilities abroad.
Japanese firms have been notably successful at using the first two
strategies to increase the international reach of their corporate R&D
organization (Rosenberg and Schonmueller, 1988; Mansfield, 1988; Hamel et al,
1989; Perrino & Tipping, 1989). They are now beginning to expand into the third
(Herbert, 1988), and as they do they face problems in developing the control
structures, human resource management systems, and communications for these
2facilities analogous to those they have encountered in managing Western
professionals and managers that have emerged in manufacturing and financial
institutions (Pucik et al, 1990). European and U.S. multinationals, in contrast,
have greater experience in setting up R&D facilities abroad: many U.S. firms have
established or acquired technology development facilities in Europe, while large
European firms have built or acquired technology centres in North America
(Perrino & Tipping, 1989). However, both American and European firms have been
much slower to use any of the three modes to penetrate the national technology
systems of Asia, particularly Japan, and they are currently faced with the
problems of deciding on appropriate technology strategies for Asia and of
building the organizational capacity to realize that strategy.
This paper surveys the major drivers of the globalization of technology and
the organizational issues involved in the three modes of extending the firm's
technology reach beyond its home country, with a particular focus on the Western
firms' penetration of the Japanese technology system.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 2
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FACTORS
(1) Growing Science and Technology Parity Across Societies: In science, the
resources of the highly industrialized nations of North America, Western Europe,
and Japan (using such indicators as papers published in refereed science journals
and peer evaluation3 ) have grown increasingly equal over the last decades, and
the increase in the science capabilities of Japan has been particularly striking.
In technology (as measured by the number of engineers graduated and the technical
competence of the labour force), the gap between the long-dominant countries of
North America and Western Europe and the later developing societies, particularly
those in Asia, has been narrowing dramatically. And within the highly
industrialized societies, Japan has moved from being a follower to being a leader
in several technology areas, including robotics, electronic imaging, and
(2) Complementarity of National Strengths in Science and Technology: While the
overall capacities of national systems are becoming increasingly equal, the
various national systems are often seen to differ somewhat in their sectors of
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3greatest strength (Perrino & Tipping, 1989: 14). This is becoming increasingly
important as new industrial products and businesses are emerging from the
intersection of different technologies (for example, chemicals and electronics,
or mechanical engineering and electronics). The centers of excellence in these
different technologies may well be located in different countries (for example,
European and American strength in chemicals and complex systems, Japanese in
electronics). The result is mutual learning across societies, growing
interdependence, and increasing internationalization of the technology strategies
of large firms.
(3) Shortages of Scientific and Technical Labour: The multinational enterprises
of countries with relatively small populations (such as Canada and Sweden) have
already been driven to locate at least some of their product development offshore
in response to shortages of technical labour in their home country (Hakanson &
Zander, 1986). Increasingly, as the need for specialized labour grows and as the
populations of the highly developed countries age, major development projects
(both public and private) will look beyond the borders of a single country for
the required technical expertise.
MARKET FACTORS
(4) Growing Geographic Dispersion of Lead Users: Recent research on innovation
has stressed the importance in many industries of close interactions with lead
users in generating product innovations (Von Hippel, 1988). But increasingly,
firms have been finding that their lead users are not always found in their home
markets. As technical interaction with foreign or multinational customers
becomes increasingly important, the flow of technical information across borders
increases, and firms are increasingly drawn into internationalizing their
technical organization (for instance, the growing number of Japanese auto
components makers who are putting R&D centres in the United States, in order to
interact more intensively with the Japanese auto transplants and the U.S. auto
firms).
(5) Customization of Products for National Markets: In the mid-1980s, the
"globalization" of markets was widely portrayed as leading to "global products" -
-
4- standardized products that were virtually identical in all national markets.
However, more recent work both in the popular and the more academic business
literature has re-emphasized the importance of customizating products to foreign
markets, either as a prerequisite of entering the market at all (e.g. kanji word
processing for selling personal computers in Japan), or as a means to cultivate
the higher-return niches in each national market. Such customization requires
either a dense flow of market and technical information across borders or the
internationalization of the firm's product development organization.
STATE/REGULATORY FACTORS
(6) Standards Setting: In industries involving telecommunications and computers
and in industries where R&D costs are extremely high (such as pharmaceuticals),
the importance of global standards (or at least compatibility across national
standards) is increasing. This has intensified state-to-state negotiations over
standards setting, and firms are increasingly eager to participate in national
standards setting activities outside their home countries. Eastman Kodak, for
example, now participates in eight Japanese standards setting committees as a
consequence of its establishment of its R&D centre in Japan.
(7) Research Funding: As expenditures for R&D rise in certain industries,
companies are increasingly attracted to opportunities for obtaining government
R&D subsidies or tax incentives outside their home countries. And there are
several reasons why governments might be eager to provide such access: to raise
the level of technology in certain key industries, as part of a general set of
policies for attracting foreign direct investment, or to ease technology-related
frictions with other states (as is the case for Japan today). The Japanese
government is proposing, for example, to locate some of the research centres for
its project on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems in the United States and Europe,
in order to encourage participation by foreign companies.
(8) Access to State-Controlled Markets or State-Regulated Markets: In industries
where the government is a major purchaser or where it controls market access
(including India and Brazil), some form of technology interdependence is often
either a condition of market entry or a significant competitive advantage in
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5gaining market share.
COMPETITIVE FACTORS
(9) Geographic Dispersion of Key Competitors: As firms have increasingly found
that foreign companies are among their major competitors, they have felt a
growing need to understand and monitor the technology strategies, capabilities,
and environments of those firms. In addition, current fashions in competitive
strategy have been reinforcing the market factors outlined above, especially the
belief that "global competition" requires a firm to have a significant market
presence in the home market of major competitors (Porter, 1984 and 1986; Doz and
Prahalad, 1987).
(10) Image-building: Increasingly multinational firms, particularly Japanese
firms, find that even in "global" industries it is important to be seen to have
a full range of value-adding activities located within major national markets,
including research and product development. And. foreign firms trying to
establish themselves in certain markets (particularly Japan) find that having
highly visible technical capabilities on the ground is important in demonstrating
to prospective customers and employees their commitment to the market.
These ten factors are the main drivers of the globalization of technology.
They are far from uniform across industries, and even within the industries where
they seem most prominent, the perception of their importance is far from uniform
across companies. But increasingly, the long-term strategy of technology-based
firms must take into account at least some of these factors in the growing
interdependence of national technology systems.
B. STRATEGIC RESPONSES OF FIRMS
Companies have three basic strategies for responding to the globalization
of technology by tapping into the science and technology systems of other
countries:
(1) Increased resources for global technology scanning and acquisition;
(2) Cooperation with foreign firms, through joint ventures, strategic alliances,
etc;
· ·--
6(3) Internationalizing the R&D function by setting up R&D facilities abroad.
The strategies are not mutually exclusive, and indeed many companies eventually
pursue all three simultaneously. A strategic alliance with a foreign company can
provide a useful window for identifying and licensing technology not only from
that company but from others in its home country with which it is associated.
A U.S. company that maintains an R&D centre in Japan can often involve its
employees there in its technology alliances with Japanese companies and thereby
improve its ability to draw technology out of the alliance (Pucik, 1988).
Each strategy, however, requires the development of the following
organizational subsystems: a control system for allocating resources, defining
(and redefining) the mandate, and assessing effectiveness; a human resource
management system for recruiting people into the subsystem (technology scanning,
the strategic alliance, or the offshore R&D facility), developing their
capabilities, and evaluating and rewarding them; and a system of information
networks, both internal (within the technology development functions and across
functions) and external (with key sources of scientific and technical
information).
(1) Increased Resources for Global Technoloqv Scanninq
Of the three basic strategies, scanning -- identifying useful technologies
on a global scale and bringing them into the headquarters research organization -
- has the advantages of preserving economies of scale in R&D, providing the
greatest control of the firm's own technology, and putting the lowest demands on
financial and managerial resources.
The main task of global technology scanning, especially in the absence of
either of the other two strategies (cooperation and internationalization of R&D),
is to identify external technologies whose acquisition could contribute to the
speedy development and production of products that meet the needs of customers,
and acuire them or aid in their acquisition. It can also assess the technology
strength and strategies of key competitors and help "benchmark" the firm's
research organization (i.e. measure the relative efficiency and effectiveness of
its use of resources in the R&D function).
----- c I
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7A company can focus its efforts on increasing the amount of time its
technical people in R&D and in other functions pay to science and technology
developments outside the home country, on the grounds that those working directly
with the technology can best understand and assess the importance of external
technology developments. This means encouraging (and paying for) participation
in international conferences, international travel, technical presentations by
foreign researchers, and acquiring and disseminating foreign scientific and
technical reports.
A company can also respond by increasing the number of specialized
technology scanning positions (a) within the research organization; (b) in
overseas marketing or manufacturing subsidiaries; (c) in specialized overseas
technical offices whose primary role is technology scanning.
Expenditures directly on the technical community itself may be most cost-
effective in the long run, and necessary in order to overcome the parochialism
of the headquarters research organization; however, they are often most
vulnerable to cost-cutting efforts by top management or even by the research
organization itself, who are prone to regard foreign travel for researchers as
a boondoggle. Yet expenditures on specialized foreign technology scanning, while
easier to justify on a budget line, may be wasted because, without complementary
expenditures on broadening the international awareness within the research
organization, the technological information generated may not be believed or
used.
This dilemma illustrates one of the reasons why companies often move to the
second and third strategies. There are at two additional reasons, the first
company-specific and the second system-specific: (a) a strong NIH (Not-Invented-
Here) syndrome in the headquarters R&D organization, which leads researchers to
undervalue externally derived technology, and (b) low permeability of key
national science and technology systems ("permeability" in this context means
accessibility to foreign researchers and companies).
Japanese firms are widely seen as having impressive success in identifying
and acquiring technology abroad and bringing it back to their home-country
_________1___1__7______
8research centres to develop products that appeal to customers throughout the
world. This success is usually ascribed in part to their researchers'
receptivity to outside technology and a commitment to incremental improvements
of technology, whether internally or externally derived. And in part it is
portrayed as a consequence of the relative openness of Western -- particularly
U.S. -- science and technology systems. Japanese firms are able to take
advantage of this openness, it is said, because of their ability to use highly
qualified technical employees with strong personal networks into the research
organization as technology scanners; they serve in relatively short-term overseas
assignments as part of their normal career ladders. Japanese companies have also
been willing and able to invest in equipping these people with the language
skills and experience to fill such assignments effectively (many, for example,
have been sent at company expense to U.S. or European graduate schools in science
or engineering).
U.S. firms, in contrast, are seen as handicapped in building effective
technology scanning systems. The long dominance of U.S. technology in many
industries has led to a strong NIH syndrome in many companies, reinforced by an
image of other nations (Japan in particular) as builders on U.S. science and
technology rather than potential contributors to it. Although the proportion of
foreign-born students in U.S. graduate schools has been steadily increasing,
relatively few American scientists and technologists pursued graduate work
abroad, and few firms hire researchers without U.S. degrees into their
headquarters R&D organizations. Few U.S.-born researchers have learned any
language but English. Therefore, in U.S. corporate research organizations, the
lingistic skills and the familiarity with foreign science and technology systems
are both relatively low. Moreover, the lower level of control exercised by the
company over its researchers' careers makes it more difficult for companies to
persuade people who are highly qualified technically to serve in scanning roles
(which traditionally have low prestige and low prospects for future advances in
the company), either at home or abroad.
The obvious solution -- to hire technically qualified locals to act as
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9scanners overseas -- runs into barriers from the relatively low credibility such
"outsiders" can develop in the home research organization; often the information
they gather, however potentially useful, is ignored. And even when circumstances
force home country researchers to turn to overseas scanners for help, the
expectations of the depth of information they can acquire and the range of
technologies they can cover are often unrealistically high, and the individual
scanners quickly "lose credibility" under a barrage of unmeetable demands.
Scanning, even at its best, can cope with only a subset of the factors
behind the globalization of technology. While it can help to acquire foreign
technology and monitor the technology of foreign competitors, it is less able to
contribute to developing close relationships with lead users overseas, and even
a well-staffed scanning office does not enable a firm to participate in overseas
standards setting. Moreover, a visible scanning presence may be a liability in
terms of corporate image.
The scanning strategy is therefore increasingly seen as inadequate on its
own, even for Japanese firms. However, both of the other two strategies entail
technology scanning, and indeed provide a better base for such activity than a
stand-alone scanning office.
(2) Cooperation with foreign firms
Extending the firm's technology reach by cooperating with another firm
embedded in the science and technology system of another country has become an
increasingly popular strategy for dealing with the globalization of technology.
Until about a decade ago, international cooperative strategies such as joint
ventures and OEM agreements were primarily driven by the desire of one partner
for access to a foreign market. Over the last decade, however, market access has
been eclipsed by technology as a reason for international cooperation, and both
partners are motivated by such technological considerations as gaining access
to complementary technology, tapping into the science and technology system of
another society, technological help in developing products appropriate for the
local market, and so on. Long-standing modes of cross-border cooperative
strategies -- such as cross-licencing and joint ventures -- have been
_1___
10
supplemented by newer forms of "strategic technology alliances." These are non-
equity partnerships between firms focused on specific activities such as joint
product development, joint marketing agreements that include technical service
and support, and OEM agreements where both partners contribute technology (one
in product development, one in process technology).4 The newer "strategic
technology alliances" have greater flexibility than the older forms, and can be
adjusted more quickly to meet the inevitable changes in the business environments
of the partners (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).
Growing numbers of managers and management analysts agree that no one firm,
however large, can adequately cover all relevant technologies in all countries
solely with its own resources, and that technology partnerships and alliances
are an inescapable feature of the era of technology globalization (Ohmae, 1986,
1989; Horwitch, forthcoming). While cooperative strategies have been
increasingly popular over the last decade, however, they have not been without
their critics. In the international joint ventures of the 1960s and early 1970s,
where one partner was a multinational firm and one was a local firm through whom
the MNC was seeking local market access, both partners benefitted from the
alliance, in different ways. In growing numbers of technology alliances today,
however, both partners are likely to be multinationals and both are oriented to
markets beyond their home countries (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). They are
potential, if not actual, competitors. Some American and European critics have
asserted that in such alliances one partner will usually gain at the expense of
the other. In the words of a recent Harvard Business Review article,
"A strategic alliance can strengthen both companies against outsiders even as it
weakens one partner vis-a-vis the other. In particular, alliances between Asian
companies and Western rivals seem to work against the Western partner." (Hamel
et al, 1989: 133).
The concern over the balance of benefits in strategic alliances between Western
and Japanese partners is growing, as many of the most visible technology
alliances are between Western firms whose global dominance is eroding even as the
Japanese companies are expanding. Japanese firms are seen to benefit more from
strategic technology alliances for two major reasons. First, Japanese firms are
portrayed as having a longer-term strategy in which cooperative strategies are
--------- -
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merely a temporary mechanism for expanding the technology scope of the firm.
Second, Japanese firms are seen to be better at learning from the cooperation
than their Western partners, in part because of the higher number of technical
people with the linguistic and organizational knowledge to understand and learn
from the partner firm, and in part because of a greater willingness to learn.
As Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad themselves state, "Western companies won't realize
the full benefits of competitive collaboration until they overcome the arrogance
born of decades of dominance" (1989: 138).
Although there is little systematic evidence for this imbalance, the
anecdotal information is overwhelmingly weighted toward the image of the Japanese
firm as benefitting disproportionately from strategic alliances. The fact that
Japanese firms are seen as excelling in two of the strategies for coping with
technological globalization -- global scanning and cooperative technology
alliances -- may be one important reason for the factthat increasing numbers of
Western firms are turning to the third strategic option: the internationalization
of R&D.
(3) Internationalization of R&D
To internationalize the firm's technical organization by locating R&D
facilities outside the home country is the most expensive and demanding of the
three strategic options. But it also provides a base for responding to virtually
all the factors behind globalization -- market, competitive, and regulatory
factors as well as those concerned directly with science and technology, as
indicated in Exhibit 1, which summarizes, in very general fashion, the relative
response capacity of the three strategic options.
EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE
As a result, increasing numbers of multinationals are moving to establish
R&D facilities offshore. Japan has been' the major target of the recent
efforts by Western corporations (Westney and Sakakibara, 1985), as the
accompanying list of foreign companies establishing R&D centers (Exhibit 2)
shows. Firms in chemicals and pharmaceuticals -- industries where U.S. and
European multinationals are in a strong competitive position vis-a-vis their
12
Japanese counterparts -- have been most active in setting up R&D centres in
Japan, followed by firms in the seminconductor industry. These facilities have
primarily local or regional strategic mandates, but some have a global mandate
in certain new technology areas.
EXHIBIT 2 ABOUT HERE
A dispersed R&D system can be built either through setting up new
facilities outside the home country or through the acquisition of firms with
established facilities overseas (De Meyer and Mizushima, 1989). There have been
two types of internationalization of R&D through acquisition. One can be called
"targeted acquisition," where a major motivation of the acquisition is the
technical capacity and organization of the acquired firm. The other can be
called "inadvertent acquisition," where overseas R&D facilities are part of an
acquisition motivated by other considerations. "Inadvertent acquisition" often
leads to the erosion of the technical capacity of the acquired firm. For
example, when Matsushita acquired the U.S. television business of Motorola in the
1970s, it deservedly received much praise for its achievements in improving the
manufacturing capabilities of the Motorola plants. Less attention was paid to
the fact that Motorola's product design and engineering organization, which had
a high reputation, quickly deteriorated. From the outside, it is often difficult
to tell whether the erosion of technical capacity that occurs in such cases is
the result of deliberate strategic decisions (because the acquiring firm sees the
acquired technical capacity as redundant and therefore unnecessary) or the
consequence of neglect.
One of the first issues in managing overseas R&D facilities is their
strategic mandate. The first major academic study of the internationalization
of R&D was carried out in the 1970s by Robert Ronstadt. At that time, he
observed four kinds of overseas research facilities in the U.S. multinationals
he studied:
1. Technology Transfer Units (TTUs): to facilitate the transfer of the parent's
technology to the subsidiary, and to provide local technical services;
2. Indigenous Technology Units (ITUs): to develop new products for the local
market, drawing on local technology;
__1__111_1___1_____IP_·_l· 1C241m
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3. Global Technology Units (GTUs): to develop new products and processes for
world markets;
4. Corporate Technology Units (CTUs): to generate basic technology for use by the
corporate parent . 5
It has become clear since Ronstadt's work that the strategic mandate of a
facility is potentially more complex than his four categories suggest. Instead,
the research mandate involves some combination of three variables: geographic
scope, vertical technology scope, and horizontal technology scope.6
Geoaraphic Scope refers to the target market for the research. There are
three categories: the local market, the regional market, or the world market.
Vertical Technoloqy Scope refers to the value adding activities within R&D.
The following categories are the most commonly used: (1) facilitating the
transfer of technologies from the parent; (2) modifying products to suit the
local market; (3) new product development; (4) basic research. In some
industries, of course, the R&D value-adding activities are somewhat different:
in pharmaceuticals, for example, the distinction between basic research and new
product development is extremely difficult to apply, but testing is an important
activity. In other industries, research on process technology is a key element
of the value adding activities.
Horizontal Technoloqv Scope refers to the range of technologies covered by
the facility. This can be a subset of the technologies covered by the home
country R&D organization; the entire range of those technologies; or a
distinctive set of technologies whose choice is shaped by local technology
strengths.
These variables provide a useful way of thinking about change over time in
the strategic mandate. The categories within the first two variables form a
continuum from less to more complex and demanding tasks. Previous studies from
the 1970s (Ronstadt, 1977; Behrman and Fischer, 1980) have indicated that in
cases where the mandate changed from less to more complex (e.g. from local to
regional or to global, and from technology transfer to product development), the
main initiative for the change came from the local facility. It was motivated
by a desire to use more fully its growing capabilities and to stretch them even
____·I __11 _I_ _I __
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further. In cases where the mandate changed from more to less complex (most
commonly, from basic to product development or product modification), the
initiative came-from the headquarters management, and was largely in response to
a deteriorating competitive position in the market. One of the unanswered
questions for the new wave of internationalization of R&D in the 1980s is whether
the parent company will take on a more active role in building up the capacity
of its overseas research organization and in raising the complexity of its
research mandate, or whether the older pattern of the major initiatives coming
from the local facility will persist.
Identifying the different dimensions of the strategic mandate is useful
because in the complex research environment of today's multi-business
multinational corporations, it is difficult to classify the emerging overseas R&D
facilities into any one category. A single overseas facility may easily be
entrusted with the following research mandates:
- in one business, where the facility has focused on developing expertise on a
subset of the parent's technologies in that business, work is focused on
modifying some major products to make them more suitable for the local market;
- in another business, where the facility covers virtually the same span of
technology as the parent organization, work is focused on developing new products
for the regional market;
- in still another business, where the facility has cultivated expertise in an
area where the local science and technology system has a distinctive strength,
the task is basic research aimed at the development of a new world-wide business.
Of course, when an overseas R&D facility is first established, its
immediate operating mandate will, of necessity, be fairly narrowly defined. But
its development over time will be profoundly influenced by the vision of the
strategic mandate of the facility five to ten years down the road, a mandate
which is usually diversified and complex. Building the organization to make that
vision a reality is a major management challenge.
C. DEVELOPING A FOREIGN R&D FACILITY: MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
R&D can be defined as a boundary-spanning and an information value adding
_____ ^__ ___·llp ·- ·-- ·---- · --71P-· ·--sl(-^91Flll-·-
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function. That is, its task is to bring science and technology from the external
environment across the boundaries of the firm, to add value to that information
through its own- accumulated knowledge and knowhow, and to pass the physical
embodiment of that value added information (product prototypes, specifications,
etc.) to the production organization. The keys to its activities are therefore:
(a) the knowledge base of its technical people;
(b) its expertise in managing the information value adding
processes (i.e. the research management system);
(c) its external knowledge networks (those that link the firm to the external
science and technology system and help to identify and acquire scientific and
technical information);
(d) its internal knowledge networks (with other functions within the
corporation), through which it passes the value-added information that it has
produced (product prototypes, specifications, etc.) to the production
organization and through which it gathers information and knowhow that improve
its value adding activities.7
Even within one's own country, developing these elements in a new R&D facility
and adjusting them as business conditions change are major management challenges.
Abroad, the challenges are infinitely greater.
The first step is of course the articulation of the strategic mandate of
the facility, and this usually involves the following steps:
(1) the framing, in very general terms, of the research mandate of the facility
by top corporate management and headquarters R&D management, usually as part of
the process by which the decision to establish such a facility is taken;
(2) the development of a more circumscribed initial research mandate by top SBU
management, headquarters R&D management, and the newly appointed local R&D top
management;
(3) the identification of a set of specific projects embodying the initial
research mandate by headquarters and local R&D management and the managers of the
business entities providing the research budget.
The selection of the initial project portfolio has two dimensions. The
____
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first is the output: that is, reasonable targets enabling the facility to
generate visible value added for the business or businesses of the company. The
second is the developmental agenda: the projects lay the foundation for
developing the knowledge base, the internal and external networks, and the
research management systems of the facility in ways that will enhance (or hinder)
its capacity for achieving its longer-term strategic agenda.
Both the output and the developmental considerations are strongly
influenced by a third set of considerations: those usually covered by the term,
"internal politics." Any decisions about the allocation of R&D resources that
involve reallocation, or even new lines of expenditure, have significant
implications for existing organizational subunits and individual careers. While
research managers may agree in principle with the need for developing an R&D
presence overseas, they may be much less enthusiastic about seeing R&D resources
go into supporting projects in the new facility rather than in their own
organization. The strategic mandate and the project agenda which meet the least
resistance within the multinational corporation's home country organization
involve either new activities, such as basic research in a new field where the
foreign country's science and technology system has a clear comparative
advantage, or activities to which the existing research organization has
committed a low level of resources, such as product modification or product
development for a particular local market. These may not, however, always be the
areas in which the corporation itself could reap the greatest long-term returns.
The early project agenda, however, has a critical influence on the
subsequent development of the facility. It defines what initial knowledge base
is necessary and therefore what kinds of people will be hired. It also helps to
define the kinds of external linkages needed. For example, a mandate in basic
research will require close linkages with local basic research centres, usually
universities and major research institutions such as government laboratories.
A mandate in local product enhancement will require closer linkages to the
customer base. The initial project agenda shapes the direction in which the
knowledge and skills of the facility's personnel develop, and begins to
_____·_1 __·_1_17
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institutionalize external and internal linkages.
Therefore a significant mismatch between the long-term strategic mandate
and the initial project agenda can lead to serious problems. For example, if the
long-term mandate is advanced product development but the initial project agenda
is exclusively focused on modification of existing products, able and ambitious
researchers may well be discouraged and either leave or feel resentful and
frustrated that their skills are not being used and developed. If an exclusive
focus on the output agenda or on a project agenda that avoids taking resources
from the existing R&D organization creates a mismatch with the general long-term
strategic mandate, the facility may have difficulties attracting and keeping able
people and enhancing the knowledge base and networks on which to realize its
long-term strategy. However, if the focus is too strongly on the developmental
aspects of the project agenda, the facility's credibility with line management
may suffer.
The development of the research management system poses distinctive
problems. Because R&D has been the last function of the multinational
corporation to be geographically dispersed, we are only beginning to confront one
of the key organizational and managerial issues involved in internationalizing
R&D: how much to introduce the research management systems and external and
internal linkage patterns from the home country and how much to follow patterns
dominant in the local environment. Traditional views in the field of
international management tended to assume that localization -- adopting the
organizational patterns and managerial styles dominant in the local environment -
- is always the best strategy. Even more recent writers, such as Kenichi Ohmae,
have asserted that effective international management depends on building a cadre
of local managers who manage in accordance with local patterns (Ohmae, 1989b).
However, such advice is largely based on the experience of marketing, which is
the function where the interactions with the local environment are most dense and
sustained. It is less useful in the following cases:
(a) where organizational structures and processes are key elements of the firm's
competitive advantage (for example, in manufacturing in the Japanese auto
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industry);
(b) where the interactions between the local organization and the rest of the
multinational firm are dense and sustained (social science research indicates
that interactions are easier between similarly structured organizations.8
The external and internal knowledge networks of the R&D organization are
therefore important not only for their role in transmitting knowledge, but also
because they are channels for information about organizational models and
themselves exert "pulls" on the organization toward certain institutionalized
patterns.
Factor (a) is a firm-level variable: firms differ significantly in the
extent to which they regard their research management systems or their modes of
internal and external linkage as key elements of their competitive advantage.
But there are some important commonalities across multinational firms on the
second factor, linkages between the local organization and the rest of the
multinational. Recent shifts in the predominant patterns of organization within
multinationals -- from geographic organizations to global product divisions --
have weakened the autonomy of local country subsidiaries and increased the level
of interaction across borders. This has increased the costs of maintaining
organizational structures and processes in the various subsidiaries that are
incompatible, and increased the pressures within the MNC for greater similarity
across subsidiaries. It has also increased the pressures within the R&D
organization as a whole to focus on output considerations, sometimes at the
expense of developmental considerations.
Whether the R&D facility follows local or headquarters patterns or whether
it develops "hybrid" patterns of its own are matters both of conscious management
decision and of the unanticipated consequences of environmental pressures. One
of the most important forces pulling the facility towards local patterns is the
implicit organizational model or models held by the local mid-career research
managers who are recruited to staff the facility (or in the case of acquisition,
are already employed). Their experience in other organizations has given them
models of how organizations should be structured. In some cases, these are based
-------I-----------'·I""P"i"
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on the organization in which they have had their most extended working
experience; in some cases, their past experience provides a negative model -- a
strong view of what should be avoided.
When a multinational corporation is recruiting managers for foreign R&D
facilities, the process is often focused on the individual's technical abilities
and accomplishments, and perhaps his or her networks into universities and
professional societies. It less often explores in detail the individual's views
of what constitutes a good research management system, how the knowledge base of
an R&D facility is best fostered, and the appropriate modes of external and
internal linkages (for example, in handing off technology to the production
organization). Yet these will have a profound impact on how the emerging
facility is organized, and major incompatibility with the patterns currently
prevailing within the MNC's research organization may cause serious problems,
either for the individual or (if the person is in a top-level management
position) for the facility itself. One of the key challenges in the initial
research agenda of the R&D facility is to foster the building of the networks of
communication between these upper and mid-level R&D managers and the home country
R&D organization.
The major strategy for countering the inevitably strong local
organizational pulls is the two-way exchange of researchers. Sending local
researchers on assignment to the headquarters research organization enhances
their technical abilities and provides them with a grounding in the research
systems of the parent organization. Sending home country researchers to the
local facility increases the number of people in the home country organization
who are aware of and sympathetic to the developmental as well as the output
considerations in building the R&D agenda, and provides greater incentives to
bring local research management systems into alignment with those of the parent
organization.
However, building career ladders that create and reinforce the networks
among the R&D facilities world-wide may well demand a kind of personnel
development structure (including the provision of language training) that the
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headquarters R&D organization has never previously had to generate. Long-term
career planning is necessary to build a cadre of home country researchers with
experience abroad at critical stages of their careers (not just as senior-level
administrators) and a cadre of local R&D managers with extensive experience in
the headquarters R&D organization. Both are crucial for the success of the
internationalization of R&D. However, especially for many U.S. firms, the kind
of long-term, individual-specific planning necessary may require some major
rethinking of their human resource development strategies.
Because the level of accumulated wisdom about managing the
internationalization of R&D is still relatively low, many MNCs are adopting an
emergent strategy: establishing facilities and watching to see what patterns seem
to work and what structures and processes cause serious problems. Monitoring and
analysis of these processes by managers and by management researchers will add
a relatively new subfield to the body of "research on research" -- research on
the management of the internationalization of R&D.
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EXHIBIT 1: COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS OF
THREE MODES OF STRATEGIC RESPONSE
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
TECHNOLOGY CROSS-BORDER INTERNATION-
SCANNING COOPERATIVE ALIZATION OF
STRATEGIES R&D
DRIVERS OF GLOBALIZATION
Access to Science X X X
and Technology
Participation in X X
Standards-setting
Access to public research - X X
funding
Technical linkages with - X
lead users
Localization of Products - X X
Technology Monitoring of X X X
Competitors
Corporate Image X
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EXHIBIT 2:
U.S. AND EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS WITH R&D
IN JAPAN (recent cases)
FACILITIES
DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT
Pharmaceu-
ticals
Hoffman-LaRoche
Merck
Pfizer
Bayer
Travenol
Upjohn
Glaxo
Sandoz
Dow Chemical
Monsanto
1982
1984
Monsanto
L'Air Liquide
Dupont
Hoechst
Henkel
Celanese
ICI
Ciba-Geigy
1986
1986
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987
1990
(agricultural
chem.)
(-silicon wafers)
Semi-
conductors
Intel
Applied Materials
LSI Logic
Texas Instruments
Digital Equipment
IBM
1982
1990
Eastman Kodak
Honeywell
Pioneer Seeds
TetraPak International
(software)
1988
1987
1987
1987
INDUSTRY COMPANY
Chemicals
1972
1981
1985
1985
1985
1988
1989
1990
Computers
Other
1983
1984
1986
1989
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1. Raymond Vernon, "Coping with Technological Change: U.S. Problems
and Prospects" pp. 160-190 in Bruce R. Guile and Harvey Brooks,
eds, Technology and Global Industry: Companies and Nations in the
World EconomyV (National Academy of Engineering Series on Technology
and Social Priorities - National Academy Press, 1987).
2. The following list of factors is based on interviews with
technology managers in nine U.S. firms with technology development
activities in Japan (five of whom also have R&D activities in
Europe) and three Japanese firms with technology development
activities in North America.
3. See for example the National Science Foundation's International
Science and Technology Data Update: 1988 (NSF Special Report 89-
307), and such analyses of the NSF data over time as Sarah
Slaughter and James Utterback, "U.S. Research and Development: An
International Comparative Analysis" in Business in the Contemporary
World (Winter 1990): 27-35.
4. See the discussions in the various contributions to the volume
edited by Farok Contractor and Peter Lorange, Cooperative
Strategies in International Business (Lexington, Mass: Lexington
Books, 1987).
5. Robert C. Ronstadt, "R&D Abroad by U.S. Multinationals" in
Robert Stobaugh and Louis T. Wells Jr., eds., Technology Crossing
Borders: The Choice, Transfer, and Management of International
Technology Flows (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1984):
244.
6. This typology owes much to the three-variable typology of MNC
subsidiaries developed by R. White and T. Poynter (1984), which
includes geographic scope, value-added scope, and product scope,
categories which are analogous to the geographic scope, vertical
technology scope, and horizontal technology scope used in this
paper.
7. For more detail on internal and external networks and their
effect on organizational structure, see Westney 1989.
8. This is one of the pillars of the recent developments in
institutionalization theory in organizational sociology. See for
example, Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1983) and Lynne
Zucker, ed. (1987).
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